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Introduction
Generally, capital structure emphasizes on a combination of debt and equity to finance a firm. The various financing decisions are vital for the financial welfare of the firm. A false decision about the capital structure may lead to financial distress and eventually to bankruptcy. The management of a firm sets its capital structure in a way that the firm's value is maximized. Many studies have attempted to discover the optimal capital structure. Despite the huge body of research on capital structure, no specific method is developed for managers to determine optimal capital structure (Sheikh and Wang, 2011) . Myers and Majluf (1984) show how managers do not attempt to maintain a particular capital structure. Instead, corporate financing choices are driven by the costs of adverse selection that arise because of information asymmetry between better-informed managers and less-informed investors (Hovakimian et al., 2004 ). An appropriate capital structure is a critical decision for any business organization (Simerly and Li, 2000) .
The reason why researchers try to find the optimal capital structure is that it decreases the cost of capital and increases firm market value (Viviani, 2008) . A review of the literature reveals that many studies have been carried out on the capital structure of industrialized and developed countries (Hovakimian et al., 2004; Myers, 1977; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and developing countries (Booth et al., 2001; Huang and Song, 2006) . However, the results of these studies have not led to a consensus regarding the importance of determining capital structure. This may be because firms use short-term and long-term debts due to their ownership structure and the context of developing and developed countries. Thus, the purpose of the present research is to study the determinants of capital structure in the firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE), and the following reasons justify the necessity of carrying out such a research in Iran.
There is no consensus among researchers regarding the factors influencing capital structure decisions, and the results obtained for other studies are inapplicable for Iran. Moreover, the research findings will help managers in making optimal capital structure decisions. It is important to determine whether factors that affect the capital structure of developed countries (e.g. effective tax rate, sales growth, risk, asset structure, firm size, liquidity, financial flexibility, profitability, etc.) can also affect the capital structure of Iranian firms and whether the effect of these factors (if any) is different.
There is a lack of empirical research on the financing behavior of Iranian firms with respect to the abovementioned internal factors, while the importance of capital structure in maximizing the value of these firms is evident. What distinguishes Iran from other countries is the presence of the state in the ownership structure of firms as well as other external factors such as trade and economic sanctions against Iran. Approximately 70 per cent of the Iranian economy is still controlled by the government (Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005) . Therefore, it is necessary to study the effects of these factors on the capital structure of Iranian firms and to determine the capital structure of these firms with respect to the said characteristics. Iran is a developing, emerging country with a weak capital market, and debt rather than equity is the dominant source of financing (Mashayekhi and Mashayekh, 2008) .
Thus, a gap in the literature and inconclusive empirical findings are a few reasons that have evoked the need for this empirical investigation.
This article contributes to the literature in four ways. First, it provides major evidence about the capital structure puzzle in Iran. Second, it uses different statistical IJLMA 57,1 methods to investigate the determinants of capital structure. Third, it provides the first evidence about the target capital structure issue in Iran. Finally, in this paper, we fill the gap by using samples of Iran's listed firms from 2003 to 2007 to examine how the ownership structure affects the capital structure. Using pooled and panel data regression, we concluded that variables such as firm's size, financial flexibility, asset structure, profitability, liquidity, growth, risk and state ownership affect the capital structure of Iranian corporations. We conclude that, in terms of the determinants of capital structure, Iranian corporations are very similar to firms in other countries. The empirical results imply that the Modigliani and Miller (1963) , trade-off, pecking order, agency and market timing theories of capital structure partially explain the leverage decisions made by Iranian corporations. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we will offer explanations regarding the context of Iran and its capital structure. Section 3 presents the theoretical background. Section 4 deals with the determinants and driving factors of the capital structure of Iranian firms. Section 5 presents the research methodology. Section 6 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 discusses the findings of the study. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.
Economic and financial markets in Iran
Iran, a country of more than 75 million people, is situated in West Asia, in a region commonly referred to as the Middle East. Iran is a country with rich resources of oil, gas and other natural reserves. However, it is considered a developing country. The idea of having a well-organized stock market and accelerating the process of industrialization dates back to the 1930s in Iran when the National Bank of Iran undertook a study on the subject. A report completed in 1936 worked out the details for the formation of a stock market and laid the foundations for the plan. The outbreak of World War II and subsequent economic and political events delayed the establishment of the stock exchange until 1967, when the Stock Exchange Act was passed. The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) opened in April 1968. Initially, only government bonds and certain state-backed certificates were traded on the market. It currently includes 450 listed companies, and it is one of the oldest and biggest capital markets in the Middle East region. There is a good relationship between banks and companies because most of the banks are governmental and those that are not are severely under the control and regulations applied by the government. The government or semi-governmental units are themselves one of the big stockholders at TSE. It can be said that bank loan is a main resource for the managers in Iran and is the best way of financial support. In Iran, there is no organized system for corporations to issue bonds for public investors. At the same time, institutional changes like the transfer of shares of public companies and large monopolies to employees and the private sector led to the expansion of stock market activity (Mashayekhi and Mashayekh, 2008) . While there have been some changes in the accounting institutions, the structure of the Iranian capital market has not changed in any significant way. According to Pourjalali and Meek (1995) , lack of knowledge about long-term government plans, high inflation rates, foreign sanctions and general unavailability of essential goods resulted in great uncertainty of Iranians about their future, causing uncertainty avoidance in the form of decreased savings in cash or current assets. The capital market in Iran is very new and somewhat inefficient. The institutional environment for Iranian firms and this country has several salient features:
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• State-owned companies and the state now own more than half of the publicly held stocks on TSE.
• The economy of Iran is under severe economic and trade sanctions.
These unique characteristics distinguish Iranian firms from those in other countries and signify the necessity of studying the effect of these and other factors on the capital structure of Iranian firms.
Theoretical discussion and empirical determinants
In this empirical paper, we will only make a brief review of the different theories of capital structure. The objective is to better explain the choice of the various empirical determinants of capital structure and their links to the different theories. Then, we will describe in more depth each empirical determinant that will be used in the empirical study.
Capital structure theories
Indeed, firms' financing decisions may be influenced by many factors; each capital structure theory that we will mention has its own specific assumptions and they cannot fully explain financing decisions. The literature on capital structure is very comprehensive, and many theories have been proposed in the literature on finance regarding capital structure[1], but it was Modigliani and Miller (1958) who formed the basis of the first capital structure theorem. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that the capital structure of a firm is irrelevant to the firm's value, assuming perfect markets and zero transaction costs. Moreover, they believed that a firm's leverage has no effect on its market value. This theory involved the following assumptions: capital market is efficient and individuals external and internal to the organization have information symmetry; there are no transaction costs or bankruptcy costs, and choosing between debt and equity financing is irrelevant. Their theory sees capital structure as the result of mainly financial, tax and growth factors (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) . Modigliani and Miller (1963) reviewed their previous theory, included tax advantages in the theory as a determinant of capital structure and concluded that firms use debt financing to make use of tax advantages, and to maximize firms' market value, more debt has to be used in the capital structure. Moreover, Miller (1977) identified three tax rates that influenced total market value of a firm and concluded that firms' market value depends on the relative levels of each of these tax rates. Thus, capital structure has no effect on firms' market value, even by considering taxes.
Since Modigliani and Miller, there have been many empirical and theoretic research studies on capital structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) founded the trade-off theory (TOT). Based on this theory, there is an optimal capital structure and the capital structure of a firm can be determined by creating balance between tax effects, agency costs, bankruptcy costs and so on. It asserts that the optimal capital structure of a firm can be determined by agency costs. To reduce agency costs, the optimal structure of ownership and debt must be determined (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first to examine capital structure from the agency cost perspective. TOT states that profit, size and growth are positively related to capital structure because they are all proxies for high debt-related tax benefits and/or low debt-related bankruptcy costs. On the other hand, the works of Jensen and Meckling IJLMA 57,1 (1976) and Myers (1977) provide evidence on positive relationships between firms' debt ratios and their collateralized assets. Ross (1977) and other researchers proposed signaling theory based on the problem of information asymmetry between managers and investors. This theory asserts that debt financing signals investors about firms' cash flow, as managers sometimes use changes in the capital structure to communicate the risks and profitability of firms to external users. Myers (1984) founded pecking order theory (POT), which is based on the hypothesized existence of information asymmetry between shareholders, managers and creditors when either debt or equity is used. POT rejects the existence of an optimal capital structure and argues that firms normally follow a pecking order in corporate finance; that is, preferring internal funding instead of external funding and preferring debt funding instead of equity funding. Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory (FCFT) discusses that, firms with substantial free cash flow face conflicts of interest between stockholders and managers. When a firm finances with debt, the firm is obligated to make periodic interest payments. This reduces the cash balance held by the firm, thus reducing the incentive to misuse the firm's cash (Stretcher and Johnson, 2011) . Debt can also reduce agency costs by reducing free cash flow and forcing the management to operate more efficiently in order to service the debt and reduce the threat of bankruptcy.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) have suggested a new theory of capital structure: the "market timing theory of capital structure". This theory states that the current capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. According to this theory, share price fluctuations should have an effect on a firm's capital structure and there is no optimal capital structure. Moreover, this theory indicates that firms issue debt and equity securities only when their market value is in a good condition, and when their market value is lower, they repurchase their shares (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) . None of these theories per se determines firms' capital structure, as each of these theories emphasizes on its own subject matter; for instance, POT deals with information asymmetry, TOT is on tax and FCFT emphasizes on agency costs[2] (Myers, 2001 ).
Determinants of capital structure
Based on data availability, the following determinants of capital structure are analyzed in this paper: effective tax rate (ETAX), size, liquidity [current ratio (CR) 
Effective tax rate
Tax rate has a predicted positive impact on debt. A company facing a high effective corporate tax rate has a need for, or will benefit from, taking up more debt to maximize the tax deduction of the debt interest. Modigliani and Miller (1963) concluded that firms would prefer debt to other financing resources due to the tax deductibility of interest
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Determinants of capital structure payments. The gains from borrowing increase with the rate of tax (Antoniou et al., 2008) . Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between effective tax rate and debt. Moreover, based on TOT, income tax is positively associated with debt (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) . Graham (1996) and Zimmerman (1983) found that there is a significant positive relationship between effective tax rate of firms and long-term debt ratio and that tax affects financing decisions. Yet, Antoniou et al. (2008) concluded that there is a negative relationship between effective tax rate and debt ratios, arguing that the effect of this rate on capital structure depends on tax regulations of each country. Moreover, Karadeniz et al. (2009) and Sogorb-Mira and How (2005) too affirmed the negative relationship between effective tax rate and debt ratios. Huang and Song (2006) concluded that there is no relationship between effective tax rate and the amount of debt in capital structure. We use effective tax rate that is calculated as the ratio of paid taxes to earnings before taxes. The paid taxes are calculated by subtracting earnings after taxes from earnings before taxes. Values for this variable are between zero and one. Therefore, our first hypothesis will be:
H1. There is a positive relationship between effective tax rate and debt ratios.
Firm size
A firm's size has a predicted positive impact on debt level. A large-sized company is less likely to become bankrupt, and therefore attracts more debt. According to the TOT, debt ratios should have a positive relationship with firm size, as larger firms tend to be more diversified and to have lower variance of earnings, enabling them to tolerate high debt ratios (Castanias, 1983; Titman and Wessels, 1988) . In addition, POT explains that a large-sized company gives rise to greater information asymmetry and, therefore, attracts less debt, or large firms have more access to equity funding than small firms (Marsh, 1982) . The existence of a negative relationship between firm size and capital structure may be due to the fact that larger firms have the ability of financing through share issuance rather than debt financing; thus, larger firms use less debt in their capital structure (Deloof and Overfelt, 2008) . Many researchers have concluded that firm size has a positive relationship with the capital structure of the firm (Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 2009; Yu and Aquino, 2009; Du and Dai, 2005; Eriotis et al., 2007; Huang and Song, 2006; Ezeoha, 2011; Bae, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2004; Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1990) . Further, Karadeniz et al. (2009) concluded that firm size has no significant relationship with debt ratios and capital structure. In addition, the results of Rajagopal (2011) revealed that larger firms have less debt. Suto (2003) and Driffield et al. (2007) have used natural logarithm of total assets to compute firm size. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is specified:
H2. There is a negative relationship between firm size and debt ratios.
Liquidity
Liquidity ratios may have a mixed impact on capital structure decisions. According to the TOT, firms should ensure sufficient liquidity through receiving debt in order to meet their commitments and considering this theory, there has to be a positive relationship between liquidity and debt ratios/capital structure. In contrast, based on POT, agency theory (AT) and FCFT, there must be a negative relationship between liquidity and capital structure; for according to these theories, firms that have enough liquidity have IJLMA 57,1 less requirement for external financing and borrowing. A further argument for this negative relationship is provided by Myers and Rajan (1998) , who argue that when agency costs of liquidity are high, outside creditors limit the amount of debt financing available to the company. Eldomiaty and Azim (2008) found that current ratio (as a measure for assessing liquidity) has a significant negative relationship with debt ratios at each risk level. They also showed that cash ratio has a negative relationship with debt ratios at lower-risk levels, and these relationships confirm POT. Deesomsak et al. (2004) concluded that there is a negative relationship between liquidity and debt ratios and reported that firms with high liquidity prefer internal financing to external financing and, as a result, have less debt; this is consistent with POT. Moreover, other researchers have proven the existence of a negative relationship between liquidity ratios and debt ratios (Eriotis et al., 2007; Sheikh and Wang, 2011) . In this paper, we use current ratio and working capital ratio to assess the liquidity of firms, where current ratio is calculated by dividing current assets by current debts, and working capital ratio is calculated by dividing working capital (difference of current assets and current liabilities) by total assets. Considering the above explanations and AT and FCFT, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
H3. There is a negative relationship between liquidity ratios and debt ratios. Marsh (1982) argues that expected retention rate (financial flexibility) affects target debt ratio. Myers and Majluf (1984) concluded that firms with more profitability have less inclination for external financing. Also according to the POT, managers prefer internal financing to external financing. Financial weakness and strength of firms and the subsequent use or disuse of debt financing depend on the financial flexibility of the firms. According to Beattie et al. (2006) , firms with more financial flexibility have less debt, as these firms obviate the need for external financing by increasing their flexibility. Moreover, other researchers concluded that financial flexibility is a key determinant of optimal capital structure, and this issue is consistent with TOT (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Brounen et al., 2005) . Eldomiaty (2007) did not observe any relationship between financial flexibility of firms and capital structure. In the present paper, financial flexibility of firms has been calculated by dividing retained earnings by total assets, and the following hypothesis has been formulated for the relationship between financial flexibility and capital structure:
Financial flexibility
H4. There is a negative relationship between financial flexibility and debt ratios.
Share price performance
Market timing theory (MTT) states that the current capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. According to this theory, share price fluctuations should have an effect on a firm's capital structure and there is no optimal capital structure (Luigi and Sorin, 2009 ). Moreover, this theory indicates that firms issue debt and equity securities only when their market value is in a good condition and when their market value is lower, they repurchase their shares (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) .Thus, share price performance is a measure that is taken into account by managers in capital structure decisions. Based on MTT, there is a significant negative
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Determinants of capital structure relationship between firms' market value and leverage (Deesomsak et al., 2004) . Usually when share price of firms increases, they issue shares and rarely receive debt (Antoniou et al., 2008) . Hovakimian et al. (2004) concluded that debt ratios and leverage are negatively associated with share price performance. In addition, some other researchers reported the existence of a negative relationship between share price and debt ratios (Deesomsak et al., 2004; Antoniou et al., 2008) . In this paper, share price performance has been calculated as follows: share price of each year has been deducted from the price of the previous year, and the result has been divided by the share price of the previous year. Considering the corresponding theory to this issue, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
H5. There is a negative relationship between share price performance and debt ratios.
Asset structure
Fixed assets are usually those purchased through debt and are regarded as backing for creditors at the time of firm liquidation. We can also say that a part of firm debt capacity is encompassed with intangible assets, which are referred to as asset structure (Schwarz and Aronson, 1967) . According to agency cost theory, the shareholders of a leveraged firm have an incentive to invest sub-optimally (Titman and Wessels, 1988) . Based on TOT, a firm's tangibility has a predicted positive impact on debt level. A company with more tangible assets would need to have more collateral assets to service debt in the event of bankruptcy and, therefore, would have a greater ability to attract more debt. Tangible assets could also have a negative impact on financial leverage by augmenting risk through the increase of operating leverage (Hutchinson and Hunter, 1995) . Chiang et al. (2010) concluded that there is a positive relationship between asset structure and long-term debt ratio. Moreover, many researchers have shown that there is a positive relationship between asset structure and debt ratios (Al-Najjar and Taylor, 2008; Teker et al., 2009; Deloof and Overfelt, 2008; Mitton, 2007; Heshmati, 2001; Viviani, 2008; Antoniou et al., 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2002) . In addition, the results of research on small and medium enterprises indicate a significant positive relationship between asset structure and long-term debt ratio (Sogorb-Mira and How, 2005) . Further, some studies have arrived at dichotomous results. Amidu (2007) and Abor and Biekpe (2009) concluded that asset structure is negatively associated with short-term debt ratio, but positively associated with long-term debt ratio. Also Booth et al. (2001) concluded that there is a negative relationship between asset structure ratio and total debts ratio (leverage), but asset structure is positively associated with long-term debt ratio. Moreover, the results of some other studies suggested, contrary to what is expected according to TOT, that there is negative relationship between asset structure and debt ratios (Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Vicente-Lorente, 2001 ). Finally, other researchers such as Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed (2009) have found no relationship between asset structures and debt ratios. In the present study, asset structure has been calculated as fixed assets divided by total assets, and considering the AT and TOT, the following hypothesis is specified:
H6. There is a positive relationship between asset structure and debt ratios.
IJLMA 57,1
Growth opportunities
Applying pecking order arguments, growing firms place a greater demand on the internally generated funds of the firm. Consequentially, firms with relatively high growth will tend to issue securities less subject to information asymmetries, i.e. short-term debt. This should lead to firms with relatively higher growth having more leverage (Viviani, 2008) . Because, companies with fast growth need to borrow more and are able to borrow more. The AT stipulates that firm's financing is a vehicle by which investors and managers can solve the problem of free cash flow. Based on this theory, firms with more growth opportunities have more debt. Rajan and Zingales (1995) came to the conclusion that when firms with more growth opportunities need financing, they can do it by increasing equity and using less debt in their future financing decisions. Therefore, firms with high-growth opportunity may not issue debt in the first place, and leverage is expected to be negatively related with growth opportunities. Moreover, based on the TOT, there is a negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt ratios (Lasfer, 1999) . Cassar and Holmes (2003) showed a significant positive relationship between a firm's growth opportunities and debt ratios and concluded that firms with more growth opportunities move faster toward optimal capital structure. Moreover, the results of some other research studies revealed that there is a significant positive relationship between growth opportunities and debt ratios (Amidu, 2007; Heshmati, 2001) . Karadeniz et al. (2009) and Eriotis et al. (2007) concluded that there is no significant relationship between growth opportunities and debt ratios. Berens and Cuny (1995) argued that growth implies significant equity financing and low leverage. Finally, Ooi (1999) and Huang and Song (2006) concluded that the relationship between growth opportunities and debt ratios is negative. Deesomsak et al. (2004) pointed out that except in Australia, there is a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. In this study, two measures have been used to calculate growth opportunities. The first measure is sales growth, which is calculated by subtracting current year sales from that of the previous year and dividing the result by previous year sales. The second measure is expected assets growth, which is calculated by subtracting current year assets from that of the previous year and dividing the result by previous year assets. Based on capital structure theories, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
H7. There is a negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt ratios.
Risk
Risk plays a very important role in capital structure (Baranoff et al., 2007) . The theory of finance (TOT) suggests that risky firms or firms that have high possibility to default should not be highly levered (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Titman and Wessels, 1988) . Thus, according to the TOT, risk is negatively associated with debt. A negative relationship between operating risk and leverage is also expected from a POT perspective. A company with high risk or great volatility in earnings is more likely to go bankrupt, and therefore has low credit-worthiness for debt. Jordan et al. (1998) concluded that there is a positive relationship between risk and market value of debts when market has a higher growth. This positive relationship may be because bankruptcy risk increases with the firm's debt. In addition, Omran and Pointon (2009) concluded that firms with more risk have more long-term debt. Ezeoha (2011) showed that business risk has no significant relationship with debt ratios. Results of other
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Determinants of capital structure research studies as well confirm the absence of a relationship between risk and debt ratios (Viviani, 2008; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Su, 2010) . Further, many studies have shown that the relationship between risk and capital structure is negative, i.e. a firm's debt decreases with increased risk (Eldomiaty, 2007; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Low and Chen, 2004; Abor and Biekpe, 2009; Al-Najjar and Taylor, 2008; Chung, 1993; Heshmati, 2001) . The existence of a negative relationship between risk and capital structure may be due to the fact that firms with more risk tend to avoid using external financing and instead rely on internal financing to prevent bankruptcy. Two measures have been used in this paper to assess firms' risk. The first measure is variability of profit, which is calculated by subtracting current year profit from that of the previous year and dividing the result by previous year profit. The second measure is standard deviation of profitability (ROA) or firm's business risk. Volatility or business risk is a proxy for the probability of financial distress:
H8. There is a negative relationship between risk and debt ratios.
Profitability
Based on the TOT, firms with greater profitability should have more leverage and debt ratios, as firms that have great profitability have less bankruptcy risk and creditors have much tendency for funding these firms. The result of the research of Leland and Pyle (1977) showed that the amount of leverage of a firm due to information asymmetry has a significant positive relationship with profitability. Several other researchers such as Chiang et al. (2010) , Reinhard and Li (2010) , Jordan et al. (1998) and Margaritis and Psillaki (2007) concluded that there is a positive relationship between profitability and debt ratios. Yet, based on POT, firms with more profitability have less debt ratios; in fact, firms with more profitability do not need external financing and often use internal financing, and for that reason, they have less debt in their capital structure. This suggests that highly profitable companies will tend to finance investments with retained earnings rather than using debt. Lemmon and Zender (2010) too concluded that firms need external funds for financing, that receiving debt has priority over equity issuance in financing decisions and that this theory better specifies the financing behavior of firms. According to the findings of Fama and French (2002) , firms with more profitability have less debt, and short-term cash flows of firms are expended on paying and settling debts. Many research studies confirm this matter (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Graham, 2000; Lasfer, 1999; Ezeoha, 2008; Sogorb-Mira and How, 2005; Huang and Song, 2006; Al-Najjar and Taylor, 2008; Karadeniz et al., 2009; Lemmon and Zender, 2010; Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 2009; Yu and Aquino, 2009; Deloof and Overfelt, 2008; Brav, 2009; Kim et al., 2006; Gaud et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2004; Abor and Biekpe, 2009; Heshmati, 2001; Ezeoha, 2011; Eldomiaty, 2007; Amidu, 2007; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Viviani, 2008; Strebulaev, 2007) . Abor (2005) showed that profitability is positively associated with short-term debt ratio and negative associated with long-term debt ratio. Chittenden et al. (1996) concluded that there is no significant relationship between long-term debt ratio and profitability, while profitability in small firms has a negative relationship with short-term debt ratio and total debt ratio. Al-Sakran (2001) concluded that profitability has no significant relationship with debt ratio in industrial sector firms; yet in large firms, there exists a negative relationship. In addition, the results show that there is no relationship between capital structure and profitability IJLMA 57,1 (Hovakimian et al., 2004; El-Sayed Ebaid, 2009) . In this study, profitability is proxied by return on assets (defined as earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets).The following hypothesis can be formulated:
H9. There is a negative relationship between profitability and debt ratios.
Asset utilization ratio
Using debt in capital structure creates agency costs (Sheikh and Wang, 2011) .Utilizing assets and their calculated ratio signify the strategic importance of agency costs. Based on FCFT, the higher this ratio, the more will be the efficiency of managers in adopting and utilizing assets (Eldomiaty and Azim, 2008) . Based on agency costs, this ratio is expected to be higher and it emphasizes on reduction of costs and efficiency of operations (Jermias, 2008) . Thus, this ratio is expected to have a negative relationship with debt ratio, as with the increase of this ratio, managers' efficiency in utilization of assets increases and it leads to more cash flow in the firm; hence, there is no need for external financing. In the present study, this ratio is calculated by dividing sales by total assets. Considering the above explanations, we can formulate the following hypothesis:
H10. There is a negative relationship between assets utilization and debt ratios.
Ownership structure
Ownership structure is likely to have significant effects on capital structure choices of firms, as it can affect agency incentives (Booth et al., 2001) . Therefore, evidence on the difference (if any) in capital structure choices between companies with State shareholdings could contribute additional insights. AT (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) suggests that the optimal structure of leverage and ownership may be used to minimize total agency costs, and the creation of a capital structure can influence the governance structure of a firm (Jensen, 1986) . In terms of the role of ownership structures in corporate decisions, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) suggest that direct state ownership is often associated with the pursuit of political objectives at the expense of other stakeholders in the firm. Consistent with their view, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) show that state-owned firms are more highly leveraged, and privately owned firms have better performance than state-owned enterprises. Li et al. (2009) showed that state ownership is positively associated with leverage and firms' access to long-term debt. Huang and song (2006) found that ownership structure also affects capital structure. Firms with higher state shareholding and lower institutional shareholding tend to have lower total liabilities ratio and lower total debt ratio. According to Su (2010) , there is strong evidence that government-controlled firms use less debt financing and that state ownership weakens the positive relationship between unrelated diversification and leverage. Brav (2009) found that private firms that rely almost exclusively on debt financing have higher leverage ratios:
H11. There is a positive relationship between state ownership and capital structure.
Method
Data
This study investigates the capital structure debate in emerging markets using Iranian non-financial companies. Firms that have reported their annual accounts without significant gaps for this period are selected. The data set for this analysis is 
Model
While most of the existing studies have used the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, we utilize recent development in the econometrics of panel data (fixed effects and random effects) to estimate the parameters in our capital structure model. Panel data models are powerful research instruments, which take into account the effects of cross-sectional data. This in turn may help us estimate the appropriate empirical model. We use general models for panel data that make it possible to produce an empirical estimate of the relationship between leverage (dependent) and firm-specific (independent) variables. We formulate behavioral differences between the various cross-section elements as follows:
where Y it is the leverage measure of firm i in year t; ␤ 0 is common y-intercept; X it is a column vector of firm-specific variables for firm i in year t, which represents the explanatory variables as outlined in Section 4 above and which are reported in Table I ; it is the stochastic error term of firm i at time t; ␤ 0i is the y-intercept of firm I; and it is the error term of firm i at time t. The panel data suggest the use of fixed or random effects that are able to control for unobserved firm and/or year effects (Green, 2003) . To distinguish the preferable set of results statistically, the results of the Lagrange multiplier and Hausman tests are presented. If the Lagrange multiplier test gives a significant result, then the panel results are preferred over the pooled results.
If the Hausman test gives a significant result, then the fixed effect [3] results are statistically preferred to the random effects results. Another advantage of using the panel data set is that, because of the several data points, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced; thus, the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. As pointed out by Hsiao (1986) , simple least squares estimation of pooled cross-section and time-series data may be seriously biased. Then we report the results for the regression model using pooled and panel models. IJLMA 57,1 Ezeoha (2008) , three dependent variables have been used to assess capital structure and specify its determinants, i.e. short-term debt ratio (STD), long-term debt ratio (LTD) and total debt ratio (TD), and the way of calculating them is summarized in Table I .
Independent and control variables.
There are several independent variables in this paper. Effective tax rate, firm size, liquidity, financial flexibility, share price performance, asset structure, growth opportunities, risk, profitability, asset utilization ratio and state ownership. Further, economic and trade sanctions, is chosen to control the effect of sanctions on capital structure. The way of calculating them is briefly presented in Table I .
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
In Table II , descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables are presented. Based on this table, we can say that mean short-term debt ratio (STD) is 61.2 per cent and its median is 61.8 per cent. Mean long-term debt ratio (LTD) is 11.2 per cent and its median is 6.75 per cent, and mean total debts ratio (TD) is 72.5 per cent and its median is 72.03 per cent, indicating that the most important financing source of Iranian firms is debts, and in particular short-term debts. As can be seen in Table II , total debt ratio (TD) in the Iran is much higher than in G7 and European countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Aggarwal and Kyaw, 2009) or China (Huang and Song, 2002) . . It may be due to the fact that accessing long-term debt sources like loans and bonds is not possible for firms or they may rarely use long-term sources in their financing decisions due to the risks associated with them. Moreover, mean current ratio is 1.11 and mean working capital ratio is 4.1 per cent. Mean income tax rate during the five-year period is 8 per cent, indicating that Iranian firms have paid only 8 per cent of tax on average, while income tax rate in Iran is 25 per cent. The findings revealed that the Iranians' capital structure choice is a result of low corporate income tax rate (8 per cent for listed companies). The expected asset growth of these firms is 24.1 per cent, signifying a considerable growth in the assets of these firms; further, their sales growth is also considerable, as the mean sales growth of these firms is 8.9 per cent. These firms have a poor financial flexibility whose mean is 3.1 per cent. The first risk assessment measure of these firms, that is variability of profit, equals 49.4 per cent on average. The second measure, which is standard deviation of return on assets, is 65.3 per cent. Mean return on assets (ROA) and asset utilization ratio are 13.6 and 85.4 per cent, respectively, signifying that on average, firms have made 13.6 per cent profit from each Riyal of asset utilized and that their sales is 85.4 times greater than their assets. Moreover, according to the table, we can say that, on average, 67 per cent of Iranian firm's ownership is public and the rest is private. To assess the distributional properties of the data, Table II reports a statistical summary of the variables. Descriptive statistics of variables show that all the variables' means are greater than their medians (except for WCR), indicating that the distribution is skewed to the right. A formal test for normality of the series can also be done by using the Jarque-Bera (JB) test, which combines the skewness and kurtosis results. The results of the JB test accept the null hypothesis of normality for all series at the 5 per cent level. Moreover, to determine the absence of multicollinearity problems, the Pearson's correlation coefficients between explanatory variables were tested. It has been suggested that multicollinearity shall be considered as a serious problem only if the correlation coefficient between explanatory variables is more than 0.8 (Kennedy, 1985) or more than 0.9 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996) . As shown in Table III , the correlation coefficients between explanatory variables are not high. As a result, we can ignore any multicollinearity problems.
Regression results
In this section, the empirical analysis of the capital structure drivers is presented. The results of regression analysis (pooled and panel) are provided in Tables IV-VI.  According to Tables IV and VI , the Lagrange multiplier test is statistically significant, suggesting the suitability of panel models over the pooled model. The Hausman test is statistically significant, indicating that the fixed-effects model is "more preferable" than the random-effects specifications. Moreover, Table V shows that the pooled models are more favorable than the panel models, the Lagrange multipliers are 1.452102 and statistically insignificant at 5 per cent.
The coefficient for effective tax rate (ETAX) suggests only a positive relation with short-term debt ratio (STD) and leverage (TD), but the total debt model lacks statistical significance, which appears to support the H1 suggested by Modigliani and Miller' (1963) Notes: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); CR: current ratio, ETAX: effective tax rate; EXPGR: expected growth; FLEX: financial flexibility; VCP: variability of profit for firm; ROA: return on assets; SAGR: sale growth; SIZE: firm size; SPP: share price performance; AUR: asset utilization ratio; ASST: asset structure; VOLAT: volatility; WCR: working capital ratio; SOP: state ownership percentage; STD: short-term debt ratio; LTD: long-term debt ratio; TD: total debt ratio (continued) IJLMA 57,1 Tables IV, V and VI show mixed results regarding the effect of liquidity and capital structure. The results from liquidity variables (current ratio) seem to be positively related to short-term debt ratio, but negatively related to long-term debt ratio. Moreover, other measures for assessing the liquidity of firms, that is working capital ratio (WCR), have a significantly negative relationship with two measures of capital structure (short-term and total debt ratio), indicating that liquid firms prefer internal resources for financial needs, and this is consistent with the POT. Thus, H3 is accepted. The reason for negative relationship of liquidity in Iran is that firms tend to use their liquid assets to finance their investment in preference to raising external debt.
The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between firms' financial flexibility (FLEX) and all measures of capital structure (STD, LTD and TD) . This provides support for H4. Considering abovementioned tables, there is a significant negative relationship between share price performance (SPP) and all measures of capital structure (STD, LTD and TD). Thus, H5 is accepted, which is consistent with MTT. The reason for negative relationship of share price performance in Iran is that they tend to prefer equity to debt when share prices are rising. The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between asset structure (ASST) and short-term (STD) and total debt (TD) ratios. This is not consistent with the TOT, but with the AT. We may attribute this finding to insufficient long-term capital sources in Iran. Thus, excessive use of short-term debt becomes obligatory. This excessive usage of short-term debt may explain the negative relationship between assets structure and leverage. Therefore, H6 is rejected. The results also show a positive relationship between asset structure and long-term debt. The results suggest that Iranian firms with a higher proportion of fix assets are financed by long-term debt capital. Further, there is a negative relationship between sales growth (SAGR) and assets growth ratio (EXPGR) as a measure for assessing growth opportunities and all measures of capital structure (STD, LTD and TD), which is statistically significant and is consistent with the TOT. The sign for the growth variable in terms of the relationship with capital structure is consistent with our H7.
The result for two measures of risk assessment is mixed. The risk variables [e.g. volatility (VOLAT) and variability coefficient of profit (VCP)] indicate a negative relationship with long-term debt ratio but a positive relationship with short-term debt ratio. However, the results of the short-term debt model appear not to be statistically significant, which support H8. Consistent with the pecking order arguments, in all regressions, the coefficients for profitability (ROA) are negative and significant, signifying that firms with more profitability use internal sources in their financing
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Determinants of capital structure decisions. The negative coefficient on profitability implies evidence for the POT, where more profitable corporations tend to use lesser debt when financing their activity. Thus, H9 is accepted. The existence of a significant negative relationship between debt and profitability depends on information asymmetry between managers and investors; that is, the amount of debt depends on the amount of information asymmetry, and in this theory, presence of debt in firms' capital structures depends on past profitability and investment opportunities. Finally, there is a positive relationship between asset utilization ratio (AUR) and all measures of capital structure (STD, LTD and TD), so H10 is rejected. Moreover, ownership appears to play an important role in firms' capital structure decisions. State ownership is significantly and positively associated with long-term debt ratio (LTD), consistent with our H11. According to Tables IV, V and VI, we also test the first-order serial correlation and multicollinearity in our data. Serial correlation was analyzed by examining the Durbin-Watson statistics. The D-W statistics of the residuals report 1.46-1.85 for all regression equations. D-W statistic ranges in value from 0 to 3, with an ideal value of 2, indicating that errors are not correlated and in all models, the level of F-statistic is significant, suggesting the validity of the regression estimation. Moreover, the explanatory power of a model is measured by its adjusted R 2 . The adjusted R 2 for the fixed-effects model is uniformly higher than for the simple pooling model, indicating the existence of omitted variables. Table VI , the adjusted R 2 for the simple pooling model is 46 per cent. Nevertheless, when fixed-effect regressions are used, the regressions have a higher adjusted R 2 . The adjusted R 2 indicates that the explanatory variables explain 66, 6, and 46 per cent of the variation in the short-term debt (STD), long-term debt (LTD) and total debt (TD) ratios, respectively.
Discussion
The study shows very interesting results in terms of the capital structure of Iranian firms. Short-term debt constitutes a relatively high proportion of total debt of Iranian firms. This represents 61 per cent of total financing. It can be said that bank loan (short-term debt) is a main resource for the managers in Iran and is the best way of financial support. In Iran, there is no organized system for corporations to issue bonds for public investors. This is because corporations would have a preference for short-term debt financing over long-term debt financing, as the cost of long-term financing is greater for the firm. Our finding on effective tax rate and short-term debt confirms the results of Modigliani and Miller (1963) , Graham (1996) and Zimmerman (1983) . However, our results are inconsistent with those obtained by most prior studies (Antoniou et al., 2008; Karadeniz et al., 2009) . Consistent to theorizing, the results of this study show that size is also negatively related to all measures of capital structure. The negative coefficient is, nevertheless, consistent with Marsh (1982) and Titman and Wessels' (1988) contention that accessibility to the equity market and economies of scale with respect to issue costs influence the firm's debt-equity choice. The effect of liquidity (WCR) on two leverage measures (short-term and total debt) is found to be negative and significant. Also considering the obtained results, current ratio (CR) has a negative IJLMA 57,1 relationship with long-term debt ratio (LTD), signifying that firms with sufficient liquid assets will be able to finance future investments with less reliance on external (debt) sources. This result is consistent with the results of Myers and Rajan (1998) , Eldomiaty and Azim (2008) , Deesomsak et al. (2004) , Eriotis et al. (2007) and Sheikh and Wang (2011) . On the other hand, current ratio (CR) is positively related to short-term financing.
The study finds strong evidence that financial flexibility may play a role in determining firms' capital structure. This finding is consistent with the results of prior studies (Beattie et al., 2006) . Furthermore, US and European evidence suggests that financial flexibility is considered a more important influence on a firm's financing decisions (Graham and Harvey, 2001 ). The relation between capital structure and share price performance of firms in the TSE is also negative, in line with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Hovakimian et al. (2004) , who found a negative association between share price performance and leverage. However, the negative (positive) association found between asset structure and short-term (long-term) debt ratio implies that corporations in Iran try to finance their fixed assets with long-term, and their current assets with short-term debt, thus supporting the asset maturity matching principle in corporations. The result is in line with the findings of Amidu (2007), Sogorb-Mira and How (2005) and Abor and Biekpe (2009) . In terms of firm growth, we can explain that a company of fast growth is normally expected to have potentially sufficient internal funds, and therefore, this company prefers using internal funds over external funds. This is also consistent with the findings of Thies and Klock (1992) , Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Hovakimian (2006) . The results also show a negative relationship between risk and long-term debt. It is consistent with the arguments that high-risk firms normally use less debt (Omran and Pointon, 2009; Jordan et al., 1998) . The overall negative relation between profitability (ROA) and capital structure suggests that internal financing through retained earnings plays an important financing role. These results are consistent with strong empirical evidence from previous studies (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Hutchinson and Hunter, 1995; Ghosh and Cai, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Gaud et al., 2005) . The relationship between state ownership and debt levels implies that higher state ownership increases the level of long-term debt financing; thus, our result shows that state ownership enhances firms' access to long-term debt. This result is inconsistent with the findings of Zou and Xiao (2006) and Huang and Song (2006) , and consistent with the findings of Li et al. (2009) .
Conclusion
This study examined the determinants of capital structure of corporations in the context of emerging markets, where the issue has been under-researched. This study specifically focused on industrial firms in Iran. Of course, there may be many factors interfering with identification of capital structure, but in this research, several variables have been studied and pooled and panel data analysis has been used to analyze the models. This paper examines the debt financing as a proxy for corporate capital structure. It is necessary to outline the basic factors that affect debt-financing decision. First, the results show that short-term debt constitutes a relatively high proportion of total debt of Iranian firms. Firm's capital structure involves a tradeoff between the common types of financing: equity and debt financing. The results of this study show that firms use both types of debt interchangeably. Firms use more debt relative to equity for financing their operations, which does not conform to the principles of financing.
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Managers of Iranian firms must pay attention to this issue, for they may face problems in their long-term investments due to utilization and quick settlement of short-term debts. They will face liquidity deficit and this can affect the performance of these firms. Second, the negative relationships between all the measures of capital structure and size suggest that size of the firms is very important in influencing firms' access to debt finance. Third, the significantly negative relationship between financial flexibility (FLEX), share price performance (SPP), sales growth (SAGR), expected growth of assets (EXPGR) and return on assets (ROA) and capital structure (STD, LTD and TD) denotes the fact that these variables play an important role in corporations' access to debt finance. The results clearly support that firms which have more flexibility, growth, share price performance and profitability demand less debt. While, the results for effective tax rate (ETAX), liquidity (CR), firm risk (VCP and VOLAT), asset structure (ASST) and state ownership (SOP) are mixed. Fourth, our results generally confirm the fact that corporations in Iran try to finance their fixed assets with long-term debts, and their current assets with short-term debts. Fifth, we found a puzzling positive relation between assets utilization ratio and the leverage. Sixth, as for the effects of liquidity, the results of the regression analysis show that the estimates of the liquidity are negative and statistically significant. These negative relationships indicate that firms with a higher liquidity ratio will borrow less (Deesomsak et al., 2004) . Seventh, the relationship between all measures of capital structure and growth opportunities is negative. This finding suggests that firms with higher future growth opportunities should use more equity financing. Finally, the results showed that state ownership has a significant positive relationship with long-term debt ratios. We conclude that, in terms of the determinants of capital structure, Iranian corporations are very similar to firms in other countries. Booth et al. (2001) have concluded that corporate financing decisions in developing markets are influenced relatively by many determinants of capital structure that have evolved in developed markets. The empirical results imply that the Modigliani and Miller (1963) , trade-off, pecking order, agency and market timing theories of capital structure partially explain the leverage decisions made by Iranian corporations. In general, the major difference of the capital structure of Iranian firms is that these corporations exhibit a higher leverage than firms in developed countries and firms in the majority of developing countries when measured by book value of total liabilities ratio (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Booth et al., 2001; Huang and Song, 2002) . This suggests that these firms significantly use debt in their capital structure. This goes along with the results reached by Booth et al. (2001) that a great deal of similarity exists between developed and developing countries with regard to the determinants of capital structure, although Iran was not included in the sample of developing countries examined by Booth et al. (2001) . The contribution of the paper is that the reported results converge relatively and considerably to the results of other related studies in developing markets, which is considered an element of external validity. In addition, this study contributes to the literature in a way that it shows that capital structure theories that are applied to Middle Eastern companies also apply to Iranian companies. The findings of the study certainly provide a framework for understanding the capital structure and financing of Iranian firms, and have significant theoretical and practical implications.
Due to the existence of a negative relationship between firm size, financial flexibility, share price performance, growth and capital structure, firms' management has to take IJLMA 57,1 into account these factors when making borrowing decisions. There is a negative relationship between share price performance (SPP) and profitability and all measures of capital structure (debt ratios), thus managers must consider this issue when financing, for increased debts in these firms is followed by decreased profitability and SPP. Instead, they must try to use such resources as equity financing. We suggest the managers of these firms to consider the capital structure of firms in order to reduce business risk, for there is a negative relationship between business risk and debt ratios of firms. However, it is likely that investors do appear to consider capital structure when purchasing firms due to the existence of a negative relationship between, growth, profitability and capital structure. Therefore, it is suggested that the following directions for research on Iranian capital structure be considered in the future:
• Some capital structure scholars have examined the implications of industry classification for the study of capital structure. This may be particularly important in considerations of the impact of capital structure.
• There is a need for further research that will examine the determinants of capital structure in sample firms over a longer period, and over a number of economic cycles, if we are to better understand capital structure policies in these firms.
• Also, the role of corporate governance in determining borrowing needs further research to develop further some of the insights delivered by this study.
• Further research is needed to investigate the effect of institutional ownership, ownership concentration and capital structure. Finally, further research can provide more explanations by considering cost of capital that determines corporate capital structure. Notes 1. Normally, capital structure is defined as the ratio of debt to equity (DE) and the ratio of debt to total asset (DTA). Debt includes short-term debt and long-term debt. Total debt which includes both short-term and long-term debt is part of total liabilities. We consider multiple definitions for leverage -partially to illustrate the dominant types of debt in Iran. The broadest definition of leverage is total liabilities to total assets. It is the most common definition in previous research (Frank and Goyal, 2002) . However, as there are important differences between long-term and short-term debt, there exists a need to examine long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio separately.
2. Agency costs arise from two agency relations -the relation between owners and debt holders and the relation between owners and managers. Jensen (1986) shows that agency costs increase with free cash flow. According to Drobetz (2005) , three forms of agency problems have received particular attraction: risk shifting (or asset substitution), the underinvestment problem and the FCFT.
3. Given that the "between" estimator averages variable observations, random-effect estimator can reduce the bias caused by the measurement error by averaging the measurement errors. On the other hand, the random-effect estimator can be biased if the explanatory variables are correlated with the residuals, while the fixed estimator is always unbiased (because it allows for dummies for different intercepts). Further, the fixed-effect estimator can be more robust to selection bias problems compared to the random-effect estimator.
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